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Abstract 
Privilege Management Infrastructures (PMI) are emerging as a necessary alternative to 
authorization through Access Control Lists (ACL) as the need for finer grained security on the Grid 
increases in numerous domains. The 2-year JISC funded DyVOSE Project has investigated 
applying PMIs within an e-Science education context. This has involved establishing a Grid 
Computing module as part of Glasgow University’s Advanced MSc degree in Computing Science. 
A laboratory infrastructure was built for the students realising a PMI with the PERMIS software, to 
protect Grid Services they created.. The first year of the course centered on building a static PMI at 
Glasgow. The second year extended this to allow dynamic attribute delegation between Glasgow 
and Edinburgh to support dynamic establishment of fine grained authorization based virtual 
organizations across multiple institutions. This dynamic delegation was implemented using the DIS 
(Delegation Issuing) Web Service supplied by the University of Kent. This paper describes the 
experiences and lessons learned from setting up and applying the advanced Grid authorization 
infrastructure within the Grid Computing course, focusing primarily on the second year and the 
dynamic virtual organisation setup between Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
1.   Project Background 
The DyVOSE Project (Dynamic Virtual 
Organisations in e-Science Education) is a JISC 
funded two-year project investigating the 
establishment of a Privilege Management 
Infrastructure (PMI) that supports dynamic 
delegation of authority in the context of a Grid 
Computing Advanced MSc. module at the 
University of Glasgow. Specifically the project 
is investigating the application of the PERMIS 
software in creating an attribute management 
infrastructure that allows institutions to 
establish trust relationships that will assert and 
enforce the privileges presented by attributes 
issued by external institutions.  
 
In the first year of the project a static PMI was 
implemented using the PERMIS authorization 
function. This allows two teams of students to 
author their own GT3.3 services and restrict 
access to certain methods provided the student 
held the appropriate ‘team’ attribute. In this 
case, all privileges were issued by Glasgow so 
no cross-organisational infrastructure was 
necessary [1].  
 
In the second year the students created a GT3.3 
service which ran a BLAST [2] query against a 
set of data retrieved from a data store hosted at 
Edinburgh University. Students were again split 
into two teams, one running a query against 
nucleotide data and one against protein data. 
PERMIS was used to secure the services at both 
sides, denying access to students in the protein 
team who attempted to extract and match 
nucleotide data and vice versa. In this scenario, 
inter-institution interaction was required, so user 
attributes needed to be recognized at both 
institutions. This may be implemented statically 
in the same way as the first year assignment by 
completely sharing user information between 
sites, but this is highly undesirable if we wish to 
deploy this kind of setup using existing campus 
directories. A more scalable and realistic Grid 
model is where local sites maintain information 
on their own users and define their own local 
security policies restricting access to local 
resources by both local users and trusted remote 
users/sites. The Delegation Issuing Service 
(DIS) aims to provide a safe, intuitive 
environment in which institutions may establish 
chains of trust without surrendering sensitive 
local user information. The fundamental benefit 
of the DIS with regard to Grids is to support 
fine grained authorization infrastructures 
whereby attributes needed for a given virtual 
organization can be dynamically created and 
recognized by remote “trusted” sources of 
authority. Through this model, virtual 
organizations can be created in principle “on-
the-fly” without detailed agreements.  
2.   PMI Technologies 
A number of authorisation control mechanisms 
exist that can be applied to the Grid, examples 
of these include CAS [3], Akenti [4] and VOMS 
[5]. Each offer their own advantages and 
disadvantages [6]. PERMIS (Privilege and Role 
Management Infrastructure Standards 
Validation) [7] is a Role Based Access Control 
System [8] which uses X509 Attribute 
Certificates (ACs) [9] to issue privileges to 
users on a system. VOMS provides ACs to its 
users, but attributes are still handled from a 
central server. PERMIS is completely 
decentralised and access control decisions are 
made locally at the resource side. These access 
control decisions are typically made through 
attribute certificates (ACs) signed by a party 
trusted by the local resource provider. This 
might be the local source of authority (SoA), 
however a more scalable model is to delegate 
this responsibility in a strictly controlled manner 
to trusted personnel involved in the virtual 
organization (VO). 
 
In a Grid context it is unrealistic to expect all 
information to be maintained centrally. VOs 
may well have many users and resources across 
multiple sites, and these users come and go 
throughout the course of the VO collaboration. 
Knowing for example that a given user is at 
Glasgow University is best answered by the 
Glasgow University authentication processes. 
However, whilst knowledge of a given users 
status may well be best answered by that users 
home authentication infrastructure, the roles and 
responsibilities needed to access remote 
resources specific to that VO may best be 
delegated to trusted personnel associated with 
that VO – it is this capability that the DIS 
service is to support. To achieve this requires 
that an authorization infrastructure exists that 
can firstly define appropriate policy 
enforcement (PEP) and policy decision points 
(PDP), i.e. define and enforce the rules needed 
to grant/deny access requests based upon ACs .    
 
PERMIS offers a generic API which can be 
applied to any resource, so our investigations 
could also be applied to non-Grid regimes.  
 
The PERMIS decision function can be a 
standalone Java API, or it can be deployed in 
the same container as the Grid Service it is 
intended to protect. The GGF SAML AuthZ 
API [10][11] provides a method for Globus to 
bypass the generic GSI [12] access control and 
allow external services to make authorisation 
decisions. Once deployed, the PERMIS service 
requires an XML policy which describes in 
complete detail the targets, actions and roles 
which apply at the resource (or at the 
institution). This policy may be written using 
the Policy Editor GUI supplied with the 
PERMIS software, or may be edited by hand. 
Another important GUI supplied with PERMIS 
is the Privilege Allocator (or the slightly more 
user friendly Attribute Certificate Manager 
(ACM)). This is responsible for allocating roles 
and signing ACs for users. This tool can also be 
used to browse LDAP directories for ACs and 
can be useful in confirming that ACs have been 
loaded correctly.  
 
In order to implement a dynamic PMI, 
extensions to this ACM tool need to be made. 
As it stands, the ACM can issue any certificate 
it wishes, irrespective of its validity within the 
PMI. Ideally a method of enforcing the 
infrastructure described in the XML Policy to 
allow an administrator to only be allowed to 
issue valid ACs is needed. To keep user 
information at the home site, it would be 
necessary to have a mechanism that would 
allow a remote administrator to issue ACs only 
with roles relevant at their institution to the 
home site LDAP. There are two gains to this, 
the first being that the remote admin can only 
operate within a very restricted attribute set, 
which would exclude any possibility of them 
issuing home site roles. The second gain is that, 
as requested, all important user data is still held 
at the home institution. 
 
The Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) is 
intended to provide this functionality. The 
DyVOSE project is the first project to 
investigate this technology to any great extent, 
with the goal of providing a user and admin 
guide to the installation and operation of the 
DIS service. In the next section we describe 
some of the technicalities of setting up and 
using the DIS and then we outline how we have 
applied this technology for teaching purposes.  
3.   The Delegation Issuing Service 
In the current implementation, the DIS software 
is a web service consisting of a Java library 
based on the Tomcat and AXIS SOAP servers. 
The web service is accessed by a DIS client 
written in PHP running on an Apache server 
which acts as a proxy between the DIS service 
and the user. This client invokes the Java 
component through SOAP calls, and is 
presented to the user in a web browser after 
mandatory authentication to Apache using their 
own username and password. These 
components may be hosted on separate 
machines, although for the DyVOSE 
investigations, they were situated on the same 
computer.  
  
The DIS service assumes that there is a Tomcat 
application server of recommended version 4.x 
installed on the server side, along with an 
LDAP server for attribute storage and Apache 
authentication. A Java Runtime Environment of 
at least version 1.4 is required. On the client 
side, a functional Apache web server loaded 
with the SSL, PHP and LDAP modules is 
required. The Apache and Tomcat servers were 
hosted on the same server with no 
incompatibility issues encountered. The 
resource OS was chosen to be Fedora Core 4 as 
this distribution contained all the Apache 
functionality and extra modules as standard 
RPMs and were loaded (and to some extent, 
configured) automatically. Edinburgh has 
successfully (in terms of providing default 
functionality) migrated the DIS service to 
Fedora Core 5. In addition, the LDAP backend 
(Berkeley DB) was of a version advanced 
enough to allow the most recent version of 
OpenLDAP to be installed on the machine. For 
the purposes of the Grid Course assignment at 
Glasgow, this was abandoned in favour of a 
slightly older version of LDAP which was 
compatible with the GT3.3 PERMIS Authz 
service deployed on a separate machine, 
although the Edinburgh DIS was successfully 
integrated with the newest version of LDAP.  
  
The DIS software itself ships as two gzip files 
containing the server and client side tools 
separately. These files include the necessary 
Java libraries, Web Service Deployment 
Descriptor file, LDAP core schema, and 
configuration files. A sample LDIF file 
containing the required DIS users and their 
certificates is provided for loading the LDAP 
server to test the installation. Due to the 
complexity of the surrounding PKI, this file is 
essential for installation as it is HIGHLY 
unlikely that a DIS-friendly certificate 
infrastructure could be deployed prior to 
confirming the success of the DIS install. One 
drawback with this is that using this file forces 
the DIS service to handle users with a fixed 
Distinguished Name (DN) which makes that 
particular setup quite non-portable.  
  
The implementation of the DIS requires a 
consistent PKI comprising a total of around 9 
certificates and key pairs in order to realise the 
service and its proxy. In several cases, the 
certificates need to be loaded in three different 
formats (PEM, DER and p12) [13] in order to 
talk to the various components of the DIS 
service, and the underlying PERMIS server that 
the DIS creates ACs for. These certificates are 
created from the command line using openssl 
after creation of a site specific configuration file 
which handles certificate extensions and 
populates the DN with a structure corresponding 
to the users present in LDAP. The two key users 
in the DIS infrastructure are the Source of 
Authority (SoA) and the DIS user. These are the 
only two users who require pre-loaded ACs as 
everyone else in the LDAP server can be 
allocated ACs by the DIS. The AC is stored as 
an attribute labelled 
attributeCertificateAttribute, with an optional 
;binary extension dependent on the local LDAP 
schema. The AC is created using the PERMIS 
Attribute Certificate Manager (ACM) GUI, 
which can also load the certificate into LDAP. 
These two pre-loaded ACs are essential to the 
operation of the PMI, and for the SOA and DIS 
user, they contain an attribute 'permisRole' 
whose entries are a list of all assignable roles 
within the infrastructure. In the case of the DIS, 
the attribute list is an explicit statement of every 
role that the DIS can assign and delegate. In 
addition to the attribute list, the SOA requires 
another attribute called 'XML policy' which 
contains the XML file representing the site 
policy. This policy states the hierarchical 
relationships between roles, which targets and 
actions these roles apply to, the scope 
references, and which SOAs are to be trusted 
within the VO.  
  
The SoA is the root of trust for the PKI, and 
signs every certificate (and through the DIS, 
every Attribute Certificate) within the 
infrastructure. A PEM format root certificate 
was created using openssl, along with its 
corresponding encrypted private key. This 
certificate is required to be present in the 
Apache SSL configuration and is used to create 
user certificates compatible with the Globus 
Toolkit, allowing Grid users to interact with the 
PMI and be assigned meaningful privileges. The 
root certificate is required to be loaded into the 
SOA node of the LDAP server, in this case the 
PEM certificate needs to be converted to the 
DER format using openssl. In LDAP, this 
certificate is loaded under the "userCertificate" 
attribute, again with an optional ";binary" suffix 
depending on the version of LDAP. In addition, 
this DER format file is required by the DIS 
server for validation, and also needs to be 
loaded into the Tomcat server keystore and the 
Java JRE security CA keystore. Finally, the root 
certificate and its private key need to be 
converted to a PKCS p12 format which is used 
by the Attribute Certificate Manager (ACM) to 
sign the SoA ACs. 
 The DIS user is the other key entity within the 
PMI, and it is this user who is responsible for 
signing ACs and assigning and revoking 
privileges. In the same way as the SoA, the DIS 
user is assigned a certificate matching its LDAP 
DN, and this certificate is converted to DER 
format and loaded into LDAP using the 
‘userCertificate’ attribute as above. This is to 
complete the validation chain for the PERMIS 
server when it attempts to verify the credentials 
of a presented user certificate. The DIS 
certificate is converted to PKCS12 format and 
loaded into the Tomcat configuration directory.  
 
Two keystores need to be maintained within the 
DIS service. The generic Java JRE security CA 
trust keystore needs to be loaded with the root 
certificate (in DER format). A second keystore 
for the Tomcat server needs to be created using 
the Java keytool. A private key and certificate 
for the tomcat server is created and loaded into 
the keystore, along with the root certificate 
(DER) again to verify the certificate. A 
schematic of the Public Key Infrastructure 
required to realise a basic DIS service is shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
The DIS service is operated by logging in to the 
DIS proxy which retrieves its authentication 
information from LDAP. Any ACs issued by 
this service are always signed by the DIS user, 
as it is his certificate (p12 file) which is in the 
signing certificate repository. However, 
information on the user that logs in will 
determine which roles can be assigned or 
delegated. The SoA has the ability to delegate 
and grant all privileges within the PMI, but 
delegated users, including the DIS, will only be 
able to delegate those roles that they possess 
and are authorised to delegate. In the same way, 
the DIS web service will only sign certificates 
and issue roles if the user logging into the DIS 
possess the relevant credentials and is 
authorised to delegate those roles..  
 
To understand how this infrastructure facilitates 
dynamic establishment of security focused 
virtual organisations, we consider the Grid 
programming assignment at Glasgow 
University.  
 
4. Implementation Scenario 
As part of the Grid Course programming 
assignment, students at Glasgow authored a 
GT3.3 Grid Service which used BLAST to do 
similarity searching on a set of either protein or 
nucleotide data retrieved from a GT3.3 service 
based at the National e-Science Centre at the 
University of Edinburgh. These services were 
PERMIS protected to only grant access to 
students in the same group (Protein Team P or 
Nucleotide Team N) provided they presented an 
AC with the correct role. Initially, these ACs 
were granted in advance and stored at both 
Figure 1: A schematic of the underlying PKI within the DIS service. 
locations for testing the service functionality. 
This is undesirable as in general, information on 
students should only really be present at the 
student’s home institution. The benefit of this 
approach is that the implementation of this 
static PMI is well understood and easily 
maintained through expertise gained in the 
previous year’s work. 
To extend this static PMI to a model supporting 
dynamic delegation, a DIS service was created 
at both sites. Using the Glasgow DIS, the 
Edinburgh SOA could login and grant Glasgow 
users the privilege to access the Edinburgh data 
store. This way Glasgow retains all its student’s 
details, yet through privilege delegation, an 
Edinburgh user can grant these users a role 
recognised by Edinburgh provided they have 
been granted this privilege by the Glasgow DIS.  
A number of different approaches were 
considered based on the current version of the 
PERMIS software. One method which was 
attempted was the use of LDAP referral, which 
would allow a single LDAP to be specified by 
the Edinburgh PERMIS Policy Decision Point 
(PDP) for it to retrieve its user attributes from. 
With referral set up, a branch of the Edinburgh 
LDAP server would point to the Glasgow 
LDAP as if it were part of its own tree. This 
approach ran into several problems, the main 
one being that when the PERMIS PDP 
searched the LDAP tree and came across a 
referral, the LDAP server bounced the details 
back to the PDP for it to do the search itself on 
the remote LDAP. Since no functionality exists 
for this the PDP crashed each time it 
encountered this referral. Attempts to make this 
referral transparent to the PDP, i.e. getting the 
LDAP server to do the retrieval and presenting 
remote attributes as if they came from the local 
LDAP were not successful. The PERMIS team 
assured us that the PDP LDAP server 
parameter could take several values, however 
despite numerous attempts this was never made 
to work. A solution was found in which 
multiple LDAP servers could be listed within 
the site policy itself under a “Repository 
Policy” subject tag. This method meant that 
referral was not necessary nor did it 
compromise local security since the entry was 
merely a location in which to look for 
attributes, and not a statement of trust on the 
part of the local SoA. 
Two aspects of dynamic delegation which at the 
time of writing were not implemented in the 
PERMIS software were those of role mapping 
and authority recognition. Role mapping allows 
separate sites with their own security policies to 
Figure 2: Diagram of the interactions required for Edinburgh to issue an AC granting access 
to its resources. 
state which roles that apply at one site can 
match the roles at another site. Typically, an 
institution will define “External” roles that have 
lower privilege than the local ones and these 
roles are typically used as equivalences. Since 
this functionality was not present on 
implementation, it was forced upon the PMI by 
an agreement which stated that the external 
roles at both institutions would be given exactly 
the same name. Now the only difference 
between an external Glasgow role and an 
external Edinburgh role is that of which SoA (or 
in this case, DIS) actually signed the user’s AC.  
 
The second function which was not available 
yet was that of recognition of authority, or how 
the VO formed between the two sites would 
recognise ACs signed by the other site. An easy 
solution to this is to add the external SoA to the 
“SoA Policy” tag within the XML policy. This 
way, any ACs extracted which have been signed 
by the remote host site can be verified. This 
method, although easy, means that a given site 
explicitly trusts all of the actions of the remote 
SoA. Without a DIS service protecting the 
assignment of ACs, the remote SoA could in 
principle assign any role they are aware about 
from the home institution to any of its users. 
The DIS service, since it only ever issues valid 
ACs within the constraints of its own site 
policy, can enforce more stringent rules on what 
the remote SoA can allocate. However, we 
suggest a different approach which has been 
implemented in our dynamic delegation 
scenario. 
 
Instead of trusting an external SoA to establish a 
chain of trust, we created a EdDIS user at the 
remote host who has been allocated a DIS 
certificate containing all the roles they may 
delegate, but which has been signed by the 
home institution. Therefore when a Glasgow 
user presents an AC which has been signed by 
this EdDIS user (within the Glasgow DIS) this 
AC will already be trusted by Edinburgh.  
 
To understand this we provide an example of 
granting access to the Edinburgh data to a 
Glasgow user. This sequence is shown 
pictorially in Figure 2, with the PERMIS 
decisions on the Glasgow side being omitted as 
this is a purely static PMI function. 
 
The Edinburgh SoA creates an “EdDIS” signing 
key pair which is signed by itself. This 
certificate is handed to the Glasgow SoA (via a 
secure channel) and the administrators on the 
Glasgow side mount this certificate in their 
LDAP directory. The  Edinburgh SoA also 
creates an AC, issuing two external roles and 
the ability to delegate those roles, to this user, 
“GlaStudentTeamN” and “GlaStudentTeamP. 
Now an extra user EdDIS appears in the 
Glasgow DIS. To demonstrate delegation, a new 
user called “testuser” was created at Glasgow, 
who was issued with an AC signed by EdDIS 
which allowed the user to delegate the external 
roles to other Glasgow users (in this case 
“User1”). The “testuser” can then log into the 
Glasgow DIS and create an AC for User1 
containing the role “GlaStudentTeamN”.  
 
User1 calls the Edinburgh Grid Service through 
their own Glasgow BLAST service. GSI passes 
User1’s DN to the Edinburgh PERMIS PDP. 
The PDP reads the Edinburgh policy, and 
locates the LDAP server to extract the User1 
attributes (contained in the Repository Policy 
list). The remote LDAP is queried, and the 
User1 AC is extracted. The PDP checks the 
signature on the AC and verifies that it has been 
signed by the EdDIS user, who although 
existing at Glasgow, is signed by the Edinburgh 
SoA. Since the chain of trust can be verified 
back to the Edinburgh SOA, who is the trusted 
SoA in their policy, the PDP establishes this is a 
valid AC. Then the PDP makes the decision 
based on the user attribute presented whether to 
release the Protein or Nucleotide data to the 
Glasgow Grid Service. Any ACs, that are part 
of the Glasgow PMI, issued by the Glasgow 
SOA, will simply be ignored by the Edinburgh 
PDP, as they are not signed by any party that 
the Edinburgh SOA trusts. This allows two 
PMIs to co-exist in one LDAP tree. 
 
The DIS can assign and revoke user ACs as 
many times as it wishes, without affecting any 
other user certificates in its infrastructure. Also, 
any users who have delegated their roles to 
other people will find that the roles they 
delegated will still be valid even if they cease to 
be members of that PMI. A screenshot of the 
DIS service window is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: The DIS service Web Interface 
  
5. Experiences and Conclusions 
 
The DIS software shows great promise as a tool 
to enable dynamic VO establishment. We have 
successfully demonstrated a VO which allows a 
SoA at a remote site to securely assign and 
revoke privileges to home users, without user 
information being factored out to external 
databases. The adherence of the DIS service to 
the local policy means that only valid ACs can 
be issued, and the scenario described above 
allows the establishment of distributed trust 
without surrendering local security. Once 
installed the service is intuitive, with a GUI 
interface that allows AC issuing in a few 
seconds. 
 
The Grid Computing module is now completed. 
Of the 11 students that took this module this 
year, all but one managed to access and retrieve 
data from the PERMIS protected service in 
Edinburgh, thus providing that the infrastructure 
works.  
 
The work has not been without issues however. 
The lack of availability of source code due to 
commercial concerns makes the tracking of 
errors and diagnosis of problems very 
problematic. This extended the development 
time of this project by an unacceptable amount 
due to our reliance on the tireless help of the 
PERMIS development team, in particular Sassa 
Otenko whom we are grateful to for his efforts. 
The underlying PKI to establish the DIS service 
is over-complicated, most certificates are 
required to be duplicated and converted many 
times through the system. This is probably due 
to the Web Proxy based approach of the GUI, 
which demands many certificates and keystore 
entries to be maintained. Some of our scenario 
definitions have had to change on several 
occasions due to undocumented features within 
the DIS and PERMIS.  
 
In the absence of source code, some heavier 
documentation would be desirable, in particular 
with regard to setting up the PKI. A simpleCA 
approach that could generate the appropriate 
keys, in the appropriate formats according to the 
domain structure of your institution would be 
invaluable. Once running, the software is easy 
to use and robust, but the implementation time 
required at this stage of the software 
development may be outside the remit of any 
developers who are new to this technology. 
 
Nevertheless the proof of concept that dynamic 
delegation of authority works has been a major 
output of the project. We believe that this 
federated model of policy definition and 
management that suit the needs of a multitude 
of VOs has numerous potential application 
areas. One key area of focus is to support and 
extend the largely static nature of ACs used for 
example in Shibboleth identity and service 
provider interactions. Shibboleth access to 
resources has up to now been based largely 
upon an agreed set of attributes and their values 
based for example around the eduPerson object 
class (www.eduperson.org). This model is not 
conducive to the more dynamic nature of short 
lived Grid based VOs which come together for a 
given time to solve a particular problem. In this 
case, dynamic creation and recognition of 
attributes based on a limited trust model is more 
apposite. As such, we plan to explore this 
technology in a range of other e-Science 
projects at the National e-Science Centre in 
Glasgow.  
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